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Always look a gift treaty in the mouth
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posted Friday, 30 March 2007
When it comes to high-tech or emotive weapons, there is a general consensus that “less is more”. The fewer nuclear bombs the better, the fewer landmines the better, and so on. Due to this, you'd think that any proposal to prohibit the spread such weapons would be welcomed by all sides. However, you'd be wrong. Indeed, there is often one overriding factor. This being that many of the nations whom possess such weapons are often far more open to the idea of other people limiting their stockpile, than they are of limiting their own. As has recently proven to be the case with anti-satellite weapons systems.
A-Sat
On 11 January, 207, Beijing provoked outrage in the West when it succeeded in downing FY-1C; an aging Fengyun series weather satellite, located some 865km from the earth's surface, with a ground launched missile fired from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province.
Naturally, US leaders looked to their own satellites with concern. Fearing that China might well decide to knock them out of the sky in the event of a war. With this in mind, political moderates described the downing of FY-1C as being a “worrying development” while more conservative elements denounced it as an “irresponsible and threatening” act then demanded that China explain itself. Both groups subsequently called on Beijing to cease and desist. Shortly after the launch, Beijing explained itself, in a fashion, and offered to give up its quest for A-Sat weapons on one condition. That others did likewise.
However, while the Washington seemed keen on the idea of China stopping developing A-Sat weapons, it prove to be less keen on signing any multi-lateral documents and promptly rejected the idea of a mutual anti-A-Sat treaty. The second time that it has done so in recent years.
Anti-A-Sat
China first tabled a serious anti-A-Sat treaty in June 2002 when Beijing and Moscow jointly approached the Washington during the international Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, and present it with draft treaty that would have outlaw A-Sat activities. However, Washington refused to pursue the treaty further because it deemed that it was not in its strategic interests.
At the time the offer was made, Washington cited the existence of the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (known as the “Outer Space Treaty “) as being the primary reason behind its refusal to further the draft. According to Washington, said treaty provided sufficient protection to US interests and did not require bolstering.
Article 4 of the treaty expressly forbids the deployment of WMD in space, or on any object that is in space. However, it carries no clauses prohibiting a nation from using an Earth based weapon against space based targets. Effectively permitting A-Sat systems.
Beijing again approached Washington soon after its January A-Sat launch. Responding to criticism over the 11 January incident, Tang Guoqiang, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN called for the existing space treaties to be strengthened in order prohibit A-Sat systems.
Though Tang received support from a number of quarters, Washington again rejected the idea of a stronger treaty on the grounds that it was still not in its strategic interests to do so.
Analysis -Why Reject Arms Limitation?
While China proposed anti-A-Sat treaty may seem like a transparent act of arms reduction, and while Washington might seem seem to be an equally transparent militaristic gesture China watchers have, however, noted that there is more to the situation than there might first appear to be.
Indeed, were other nations to sign up to the treaty, it would likely serve China's interests more than theirs, for two key reasons.
1)A treaty would prevent signatory nations without A-Sat capabilities from developing systems to rival the technology that China already possesses
2)A treaty would effectively prevent signatory nations that currently have A-Sat capabilities from upgrading or updating their systems at a time when China's ability to build and launch military satellites is rapidly progressing.
As such, an anti-weaponization treaty would serve China in much the same way that non-proliferation treaties have served the nuclear superpowers US, Russia, France and the UK. By preventing others from obtaining its level of advancement, or from developing countermeasures against it.
The Detail
A future anti-A-Sat treaty would likely require 1 of 2 things from its its signatories.
A) The scrapping of A-Sat systems
B) Limitations on the possession and research of A-Sat systems
Though either of these conditions would restrict China's A-Sat program, they would both serve to China's tactical advantage, more than to the advantage of other nations.
Option A - A complete Moratorium
In the case of option A, China currently has only a limited A-Sat capability which is insufficient to neutralize the foreign satellites capabilities that could be directed against during a regional conflict. In contrast, China's strategic competitors have much more advanced A-Sat programs that could easily cripple China's satellite network.
This means that a moratorium would effectively result in China trading it young and tactically limited A-Sat system in exchange for the safety of a much more strategically important satellite systems.
Put the other way around, it would mean China's strategic competitors saving a handful of their own satellites fro an unproven threat, in exchange guaranteeing the safety of all of China's satellites. Something that might not be too smart given China's rapidly developing ability to manufacture and launch military tracking and communication satellites.
Option B - Arms Limitation
At present, China has only limited A-Sat capabilities, but has a lot of room for expansion. In order to prevent this expansion, treaty limitation would have to be set low. While this would prevent China from expanding, or limit its expansion, such restrictions would likely mean that China's strategic competitors would have to make active cuts to their programs. Or even scrap them all together if they are not sufficiently advanced to be viable within the bounds of treaty restrictions.
As an example, were a treaty to limit the number of A-Sat strike platforms held by a signatory, any number low enough to prevent China from expanding could also be so low that it would force nations such as America and Russia to actively cut A-Sat programs. Equally, were a treaty to put in place limitations such as moratorium on the use of satellites as targets during live fire runs, it could effectively prevent notations such as Japan and Chinese Taiwan - Who have no A-Sat capabilities - from developing their own system, but leave China with its existing system intact.
Analysis -Target Nations
Targets for a future anti-A-Sat treaty would likely include:
If Taipei rejected a treaty, it could be portrayed as being aggressive and separationist by Beijing, and if it agreed, it would put the Taipei and the Washington in an exceedingly awkward position in the event of a war with China. With Taipei either having to break the treaty in spirit by allowing the US to launch A-Sats on its behalf, or to insist on upholding the treaty, effectively ordering the much more powerful US to hold fire. Both of which would be politically damaging for either state. A similar situation exists between Tokyo and Washington.
Analysis -Why Launch, then Ban?
While it might seem contrary for Beijing to conduct a weapons launch and then call for such weapons to be banned, such behavior is not without precedent. Indeed opaque regimes such as China have previously been known to put on a show of strength (for example, conducting a military excessive near a sensitive area) prior to offering a treaties or similar.
This is often done as way of emphasizing that it is in the other party's interest to sign up to the proffered treaty, and a way of creating face at home by making it appear as if the other part is backing down in the face of their capabilities.
The Status Quo?
Between 1963 and 1972, Russia conducted 20 experimental A-Sat related launches (including the launch of orbital targets). It temporarily halted these launches in 1972 due to the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. However, it resumed experiments again in 1976, partly in response to US experiments. Then, between1978 and 1982, Russia carried out an average of 1 A-Sat interception per year.
Similarly, the US conducted a number of missile based A-Sat experiments of its own during the cold war. However, most experiments were platform demonstrations only and did not involve the destruction of a live target. To date, the only confirmed destruction of a space borne target by a US A-Sat missile occurred in October 1985. Two more live fire exercises were planned (as noted by the launch of target satellites), but budget cuts meant that the intercepts did not go ahead.
During this time, both sides also sought to develop a variety of non-conventional A-Sat platforms, including EMP weapons and laser weapons. To date, the exact level of success and advancement of these programs remains unclear.
A-Sat
On 11 January, 207, Beijing provoked outrage in the West when it succeeded in downing FY-1C; an aging Fengyun series weather satellite, located some 865km from the earth's surface, with a ground launched missile fired from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province.
Naturally, US leaders looked to their own satellites with concern. Fearing that China might well decide to knock them out of the sky in the event of a war. With this in mind, political moderates described the downing of FY-1C as being a “worrying development” while more conservative elements denounced it as an “irresponsible and threatening” act then demanded that China explain itself. Both groups subsequently called on Beijing to cease and desist. Shortly after the launch, Beijing explained itself, in a fashion, and offered to give up its quest for A-Sat weapons on one condition. That others did likewise.
| "Since other countries care about this question and are opposed to weaponization of space and an arms race in space, then let us join hands to realize this goal" Jiang Yu, Foreign Ministry spokesperson, China |
However, while the Washington seemed keen on the idea of China stopping developing A-Sat weapons, it prove to be less keen on signing any multi-lateral documents and promptly rejected the idea of a mutual anti-A-Sat treaty. The second time that it has done so in recent years.
Anti-A-Sat
China first tabled a serious anti-A-Sat treaty in June 2002 when Beijing and Moscow jointly approached the Washington during the international Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, and present it with draft treaty that would have outlaw A-Sat activities. However, Washington refused to pursue the treaty further because it deemed that it was not in its strategic interests.
At the time the offer was made, Washington cited the existence of the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" (known as the “Outer Space Treaty “) as being the primary reason behind its refusal to further the draft. According to Washington, said treaty provided sufficient protection to US interests and did not require bolstering.
Article 4 of the treaty expressly forbids the deployment of WMD in space, or on any object that is in space. However, it carries no clauses prohibiting a nation from using an Earth based weapon against space based targets. Effectively permitting A-Sat systems.
各缔约国保证：不在绕地球轨道放置任何携带核武器或任何其他类型大规模毁灭性武器的实体，不在天体配置这种武器，也不以任何其他方式在外层空间布署此种武器。 各缔约国必须把月球和其他天体绝对用于和平目的。禁止在天体建立军事基地、设施和工事：禁止在天体试验任何类型的武器以及进行军事演习。不禁止使用军事人员进行科学研究或把军事人员用于任何其他的和平目的。不禁止使用为和平探索月球和其他天体所必须的任何器材设备。 第四条, 外层空间条约 (1967) States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited. Article IV, Outer Space Treaty (1967) |
Beijing again approached Washington soon after its January A-Sat launch. Responding to criticism over the 11 January incident, Tang Guoqiang, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN called for the existing space treaties to be strengthened in order prohibit A-Sat systems.
| "The current Outer Space Treaty has clear inadequacies in preventing the weaponization of outer space and arms races in outer space," Tang Guoqiang, Ambassador to the UN, China |
Though Tang received support from a number of quarters, Washington again rejected the idea of a stronger treaty on the grounds that it was still not in its strategic interests to do so.
Analysis -Why Reject Arms Limitation?
While China proposed anti-A-Sat treaty may seem like a transparent act of arms reduction, and while Washington might seem seem to be an equally transparent militaristic gesture China watchers have, however, noted that there is more to the situation than there might first appear to be.
Indeed, were other nations to sign up to the treaty, it would likely serve China's interests more than theirs, for two key reasons.
1)A treaty would prevent signatory nations without A-Sat capabilities from developing systems to rival the technology that China already possesses
2)A treaty would effectively prevent signatory nations that currently have A-Sat capabilities from upgrading or updating their systems at a time when China's ability to build and launch military satellites is rapidly progressing.
As such, an anti-weaponization treaty would serve China in much the same way that non-proliferation treaties have served the nuclear superpowers US, Russia, France and the UK. By preventing others from obtaining its level of advancement, or from developing countermeasures against it.
The Detail
A future anti-A-Sat treaty would likely require 1 of 2 things from its its signatories.
A) The scrapping of A-Sat systems
B) Limitations on the possession and research of A-Sat systems
Though either of these conditions would restrict China's A-Sat program, they would both serve to China's tactical advantage, more than to the advantage of other nations.
Option A - A complete Moratorium
In the case of option A, China currently has only a limited A-Sat capability which is insufficient to neutralize the foreign satellites capabilities that could be directed against during a regional conflict. In contrast, China's strategic competitors have much more advanced A-Sat programs that could easily cripple China's satellite network.
This means that a moratorium would effectively result in China trading it young and tactically limited A-Sat system in exchange for the safety of a much more strategically important satellite systems.
Put the other way around, it would mean China's strategic competitors saving a handful of their own satellites fro an unproven threat, in exchange guaranteeing the safety of all of China's satellites. Something that might not be too smart given China's rapidly developing ability to manufacture and launch military tracking and communication satellites.
Option B - Arms Limitation
At present, China has only limited A-Sat capabilities, but has a lot of room for expansion. In order to prevent this expansion, treaty limitation would have to be set low. While this would prevent China from expanding, or limit its expansion, such restrictions would likely mean that China's strategic competitors would have to make active cuts to their programs. Or even scrap them all together if they are not sufficiently advanced to be viable within the bounds of treaty restrictions.
As an example, were a treaty to limit the number of A-Sat strike platforms held by a signatory, any number low enough to prevent China from expanding could also be so low that it would force nations such as America and Russia to actively cut A-Sat programs. Equally, were a treaty to put in place limitations such as moratorium on the use of satellites as targets during live fire runs, it could effectively prevent notations such as Japan and Chinese Taiwan - Who have no A-Sat capabilities - from developing their own system, but leave China with its existing system intact.
Analysis -Target Nations
Targets for a future anti-A-Sat treaty would likely include:
- America and Russia: who both maintain their own independent A-Sat capabilities
- Japan: whose post war constitution currently prohibits it from maintaining any weapons with sufficient range to target a satellite, but whose level of technology means that it could produce an A-Sat system if it chose to
- The EU: Which traditionally backs most forms of disarmament and most non-proliferation initiatives.
If Taipei rejected a treaty, it could be portrayed as being aggressive and separationist by Beijing, and if it agreed, it would put the Taipei and the Washington in an exceedingly awkward position in the event of a war with China. With Taipei either having to break the treaty in spirit by allowing the US to launch A-Sats on its behalf, or to insist on upholding the treaty, effectively ordering the much more powerful US to hold fire. Both of which would be politically damaging for either state. A similar situation exists between Tokyo and Washington.
Analysis -Why Launch, then Ban?
While it might seem contrary for Beijing to conduct a weapons launch and then call for such weapons to be banned, such behavior is not without precedent. Indeed opaque regimes such as China have previously been known to put on a show of strength (for example, conducting a military excessive near a sensitive area) prior to offering a treaties or similar.
This is often done as way of emphasizing that it is in the other party's interest to sign up to the proffered treaty, and a way of creating face at home by making it appear as if the other part is backing down in the face of their capabilities.
The Status Quo?
Between 1963 and 1972, Russia conducted 20 experimental A-Sat related launches (including the launch of orbital targets). It temporarily halted these launches in 1972 due to the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. However, it resumed experiments again in 1976, partly in response to US experiments. Then, between1978 and 1982, Russia carried out an average of 1 A-Sat interception per year.
Similarly, the US conducted a number of missile based A-Sat experiments of its own during the cold war. However, most experiments were platform demonstrations only and did not involve the destruction of a live target. To date, the only confirmed destruction of a space borne target by a US A-Sat missile occurred in October 1985. Two more live fire exercises were planned (as noted by the launch of target satellites), but budget cuts meant that the intercepts did not go ahead.
During this time, both sides also sought to develop a variety of non-conventional A-Sat platforms, including EMP weapons and laser weapons. To date, the exact level of success and advancement of these programs remains unclear.
View Comments/Add a Comment (4)
1. usinkorea left...
Monday, 2 April 2007 5:53 pm
Not my area of knowledge, but I can guess at one reason the US would not
want to sign such a deal: the fact that the United Nations or other
grouping of nations tend not to enforce such treaties when broken. If/when
an Iran or North Korea gain such technology and perfect the minimal
capability to reach satillites with a missile, will China, Russia, the EU
nations, the UN do something to eradicate that threat? No.
2. ACB left...
Monday, 2 April 2007 6:45 pm
Sorry, but that's a little bit of a Fox centric notion.
3. usinkorea left...
Wednesday, 4 April 2007 5:31 am
I don't know if my other comment got through, it appeared it didn't, so I'm
reposting.
4. ACB left...
Wednesday, 4 April 2007 3:58 pm
You're right about one thing, it is Fox thinking.