China, America, and the Somali Pirate Paradox?

If one thing can be said to be true about the greater Sino-US relationship, it is this: Nothing is ever simple. Indeed, the entire Sino-US dynamic is a coplex world filled with twists and turns and, most of all, paradoxes. Indeed, almost everything of note that Beijing does that gives to the US with one hand threatens to take something else away with the other, and vice versa.

On one hand China is one giant manufacturing hub which supplies America with the cheap consumer products that allow the American people to enjoy a lifestyle that they could not otherwise afford, and such a ready supply of cheap goods also allows the US retail sector to be one of the most vibrant in the world. However, this comes at a price. The more China's factories output the more they compete with the US for raw materials and energy supplies. Putting the cost of both up for US industry and Us consumers. Equally, them more cheap goods that China produces the less room there is for American goods, which tend to be more expensive even when the quality is the same. Meaning that as China has grown as a manufacturer so America has shrunk.

Equally, America has long told China that if it wishes to be treated like a responsible world player then it has to start acting like one, and has thusly pressured China to use its influence to help resolve international issues such as the North Korea question. However, while a newly interactive China has indeed used its influence to move some situations in a direction favored by the US it has also used it it to move other situations in directions dictated by its own world view. Directions that have often put it in conflict with US interests.

Naturally, Washington is none to happy about either of these situations. While it has gained on some fronts it has lost on others. It has also found that the genie that is china can neither be controlled nor put back in its bottle.

A New Paradox?

In the past most of the paradoxes facing the Sino-Us relationship have been either political or economic: China as an economic partner but also a competitor, China as a diplomatic partner: but one with ideas and interests of its own. However, as China moves further out of its own shadow, and as it takes a greater interest in being part of the world at large, it looks as if a new paradox could be looming. A military paradox.

Military Paradox?

Though there has always been a military issue between China and the US it has historically been an issue of opposition rather than one of paradox. In brief, America has always seen the prospect of China having have a capable and assertive military as being against US interests.

Back in the day the only place that you used to find the Chinese military was:

1) Mainland China
2) A few select locations in places such as Africa - where liaison and advisory work was required

At the times neither of these presented paradoxes. Washington considered both to be bad. China having forces in its own back yard meant that it could intervene in strategically important locations such as Japan and Chinese-Taiwan, and because of it's potential to counter US influence in the region, while China having advisers overseas was bad because it meant that people were looking to China for support and guidance rather than to America. There was no paradox, just confrontation.

Changing Times?

With time the situation slowly changed and China began to come in from the cold. By the 1990s Beijing had all but stopped sending out military advisers under its own auspices and had started sending peace keepers under the auspices of the Un, and while this meant that there were actually many more Chinese troops serving overseas, and many more getting valuable field experience, this was not a paradox because Chinese peace keepers weren't a threat to US interests.

Chinese Peace Keepers built roads and bridges, delivered aid, and generally allowed America to commit its forces to fighting foreign wars instead. Their presence doesn't prevent America from doing anything in the same way that they might if they were an independent force, and it didn't gain China much: At least not much the hard power advocating US administrations of the time considered threatening.

Now enter the Somali Pirates.

The Somali Pirate Question?

For those not in the know, Somali pirates are gangs of maritime brigands who raid shipping off of the Somali coast, which lyes on the strategically important horn of Africa. During 2008 alone they seized over 40 vessels and have extorted in excess of $US30 million out of various parties around the world in the form of ransom payments for crew, ships and cargo.

Given that over 1200 Chinese ships, crews, or cargoes pass thought the region each year it is not an exaggeration to say that China has been none to happy about this. Especially not given the fact that over 100 attempts - 7 of which succeeded - were made against Chinese interests over the last year.

Now Enter the PLA Navy, and the paradox

The PLA Navy Question?

Late in 2008 Beijing announced that it was to dispatch a small flotilla of ships to the Horn of Africa to protect shipping as it passed through pirate territory. The flotilla was to join with a multi-national task force operating in the Gulf of Aden under UN mandate and would be tasked with deterring pirate attacks and, where possible, interdicting the pirates themselves.

Officially, China's decision was welcomed by the US, which greeted it as being a step forward in the fight against piracy, and a measure by Beijing to integrate itself with the wider world community. Unofficially, however, the deployment has Washington worried on several levels.

On one hand China's presence will strengthen the West's own campaign against Somali pirates by providing it with ships to bolster thinly spread US and European
forces. Making it harder for pirates to slip through the net, and easier to intercept them once they are have been located. it will also serve to strengthen the bond between China and the other nations involved.

On the other hand, however, the mission marks a significant advancement in China's naval strategy. Specifically, it potentially marks the start of the PLA Navy's transition from a brown water fleet: A fleet that stays close to its own coastal waters, to a blue water fleet: A fleet that roams further afield. On the surface this may not seem like a big deal, but to military strategists and China watchers it is a notable change of direction. To be exact, it is a reversal of almost 500 years of Chinese naval policy. It has Washington concerned, not to mention the other regional naval powers.

A Blue Water Navy?

To date, China's has publicly maintained that the PLA Navy exists a as a purely defensive brown water navy. A force operating exclusively within range of Chinese teritorial waters, and exclusively for the purpose of defending the Chinese Mainland form external aggressors. A force which, by definition, is not a threat anybody by dint of not having the ability to "reach out and touch" anybody.

However, this latest development signals something that analysts and China watchers have been cautioning for some time: That Beijing intends to expand the PLAN into a fully fledged blue water navy. A force that can operate outside of China's land based C&C and support umbrella for extended durations. Thus posessing the range required to launch an assault against foreign powers or their maritime assets.

In the context of China, and Sino-global dynamic this would be a significant step.

Japan?

According to observers in Japan, the prospect of the PLAN becoming blue water is of considerable concern to Tokyo. Not least of all because Japan and China have a number of competing maritime interests. Including a disputed boundary and competing claims to undersea energy reserves.

At present Japan's Navel Self Defense Force is the more capable force in the disputed region by dint of its higher level of experience and technology. However it is also the furthers from home and it is limited in capability by Japan's pacifist constitution which forbids it from mounting long ranged weapons or from fielding aircraft carriers . In the face of a blue water PLAN, especially one with aircraft carriers providing it with air support, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force could find itself vulnerable to an otherwise less advanced navy operating in more favorable conditions. And at China's present level of advancement it is debatable how long China would remain the least advanced of the two, with Beijing's newest line of ships fast reaching parity with Japan's.

Taiwan?

Taiwan has equal trepidations. At present it faces a substantial direct threat from China's brown water forces, which possess the capabilities to both attach and blockade the disputed island. A blue water Chinese navy could act more swiftly to blockade the island in the event of a confrontation, it could also push the blockade further way from Taiwanese waters than a brown water fleet could. Thus forcing friendly forces to operate with reduced support from the island, and forcing them to extend themselves further when attempting to confront Chinese forces in proximity to the island. Thus making them more vulnerable.

India?

While it is less concerned about a direct conflict than Japan and Chinese-Taiwan, India, too, has concerns about the prospect of China upgrading its brown water fleet to a blue water fleet.

At present the Indian navy is the dominant force in the Indian Ocean. Able to operate without chalage so long as it doesn't encroach on US interests. A blue water Chinese fleet could potentially change the regional dynamic. Forcing India to take into account the Chinese perspective on any given situation before acting - Thus inhibiting it from acting unilaterally as it currently can.

America?

Now America. While it is highly unlikely that China would consider it economical to enhance its navy to the point that it could launch a war of aggression against the US mainland - thus meaning that even an upgraded PLAN would pose no threat to American territorial waters - the prospect of the PLAN being able to operate away from Mainland support for an expended duration is an uncomfortable one for Washington on several fronts.

Today, America is the dominant naval force in the Asia Pacific region. It can largely operate unchallenged and it acts as a nexus for smaller friendly states to gather round. But were China to develop full blue water capabilities this dominance would be challenged, and there would be an alternative nexus for the South East Asian nations to turn to.

The most dramatic implication of this would be that in the event of a military conflict. In such an event America would have to commit far more resources to achieve the same results, and would face the prospects of taking far higher casualties due to the increased reach and capability of an upgraded PLAN. In short, facing down china would be much harder, and a military victory would be would be more costly.

If a shooting war were to break out over Chinese-Taiwan - which America has pledged to defend - American forces would have to stand off much further from Chinese territory because of the PLAN's greater reach, and would have to commit more forces to guarding supply lines and carriers from attack. US forces would have to be larger and would have to travel further to reach combat zones for the same reason. Leaving US attack forces outside of their primary C&C and defense zones for longer and making them more vulnerable to counter attack.

Equally, full blue water capabilities would enable China to push its defense zone out further. Making it much more risky for US forces attempting to attack China's population centers by increasing the distance at which Beijing could intercept any incoming threat. It could also thwart Us efforts to blockade China, which would be a serious blow to any attempt by the US to pressure China into a capitulating without combat in event a lower level dispute.

It needn't even be a Sino-US conflict. Having blue water capabilities could allow China to intervene on behalf of another nation, and in doing so could help to dictate the terms of peace between its neighbors. Allowing terms to be put in place that America might object to, or which might have been dictated differently had America been the one to intervene first.

Even in peacetime the prospect of a blue water PLAN is a threat to the US as it could be used to provide other nations with an alternative the Us when it comes to regional disaster relief, or any of the 101 things that a blue water navy does when it isn't fighting. Thus increasing China's soft power at Washington's expense, and allowing china to provide a service free from the strings that Washington so often attaches.

A China Watcher's Perspective

So, here is our paradox. An upgraded PLAN with blue water capabilities could prove a boon to the US. Completing humanitarian missions, fighting piracy on the high seas, taking the strain off of Western forces, generally helping to make the world a better place. However it could also decrease America's ability to influence world events and increase the potential cost to it of a war with China. It gives with one hand but takes away with the other.

Of course, how far this paradox will go, and how deep it will run, are still a matter for debate. We can only speculate at how far Beijing will take its blue water aspirations. Over the past 5 years Beijing has significantly expanded its submarine fleet to the point that China now possesses a small but capable blue water fleet that could seriously cramp the style of a US carrier groups, and officials in Beijing are now openly discussing their aspirations for an aircraft (carrier or two), which would essentially give Beijing the ability to project its forces around the world and back again. However, whether any of this goes anywhere is still speculation. China's navy has essentially been a local fleet for 500 years and habits like that don't get given up easily. Especially not by countries like China, and especially not at times when the US economy is going south and is threatening to take China's with it.

The final word on this should probably be "Three ships fighting Somali pirates does not (yet) a blue water navy make".

Afterthoughts

While "three ships does not a blue water navy make", it does make a good starting point. As such China watchers have noted that participation in interdictions in the Gulf of Aden will provide the PLAN with invaluable experience on which the foundations of more ambitious blue water operations could be based. And maybe even a blue water navy at a later date

China watchers have equally noted that participating in international operations will provide Beijing with an invaluable opportunity to observe its fellow participants. With China likely to pay special attention to how they communicate, and how they co-ordinate actions between their ships and aircraft. As such, Us forces are likely to come under particualr scrutiny. Not just because they are a possible oponent, and not just because they have close tied to other possible opponents such as Japan and Chinese-Taiwan, but also because they have a wealth of experience in combined forces operations that could be used to jump start any future efforts by Beijing.

Fighting Somali pirates could indeed only be the start.

The flotilla?

China's flotilla was recently confirmed to consist of 3 ships. The destroyers "Haikou" (171) and "Wuhan" (169 ) and the long ranged supply ship Weishanhu.

The Haikou is a type 052C (Luyang II)  advanced guided msiile destroyer specializing in long ranged target identification and terminal target interception. It was the first Chinese vessel to be equipped with quaf phase array radar bank. The Wuhan is a type 052B 9Luyang I) guided missile with a multirole loadout. They were commissioned in 2005 and 2004, respectively. In addition to their missile loadouts they are armed with a broad variety of conventional ship mounted weapons including naval cannons and helicopters. According to reports, the ships will carry a total of 70 special forces commandos between them.

The Weishanhu is a long ranged Fuchi class supply vessel equipped with fuel and cargo supply ports capable of supplying warships in rough seas. It was commissioned in 2004 and will be used to allow the destroyers to operate away from their home base for an extended period of time.

As yet it is uncertain how long the destroyers will spend at sea, though early reports indicate that they will patrol the region for 3 months, after which they may remain in the area to conduct further extended patrols.

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