Japan's elections: A China Watcher's View

As far as most China watchers have been concerned, Japanese elections are usually a non issue. For last 20-30 years it's pretty much been a formality which party will win and who each election will bring to the higher leadership roles. It's also pretty much been a foregone conclusion what effect this will have on the often rocky relationship between China and Japan.

There have been a few cliff angers and a few interesting moments, but mostly there has just been the certainty that while a day may be a long time in politics in the West, in Japan it's often pointless to use any unit shorter than a decade.

However, for the first time in a long time genuine uncertainly exists over what the future will bring. With different analysts making their own predictions and coming to their own conclusions, and yet more analysts wondering how many of said conclusions are anything more than guesswork and/or wishful thinking.

One thing is for certain, there are currently more questions than answers about what Japan's change of government holds for the Sino-Japanese dynamic. Does it herald a new beginning, the start of a new era of Sino-Japanese cooperation free from the baggage of the past? Does it herald more of the same, with Japan's legandarily slow pace of political change coming into effect despite the turnaround in administrations? Or are we seeing the dawning of a new age of conflict and confrontation? With Japan finding new and interesting ways to upset China, either by accident, or on purpose.

Uncertainty?

Under previous Japanese administrations observes could always be certain which way Japan's ruling party would swing on any given issue: because it was the way that they had always swung, and where the points of tension with the Mainland would come: because they were the same old points of tension. However, Japan's Prime Mister in waiting, Hatoyama Yukio is very much an unknown quantity, and his part – The Democratic Party of Japan - is equally an unknown quantity.

True, a lot is known about both.  Hatoyama is an old hand from one of Japan's premier political dynasties, and the DPJ is equally established on the political scene. But everything that is known about them relates directly to their role as Japan's opposition, not as Japan's ruling party.

As such, analysts have cause to question how many of  Hatoyama's past statements, and how much of the DPJ's past stances, have represented their core, and how much of them have represented their need to distinguish themselves from the then ruling LDP.

Will Hatoyama and the DPJ govern according to their values as members of the opposition or will they change now that the mantle of leadership has been passed over? Do they have true colors to show, or are they showing them right now? And will they be able to follow through on their promises now that they now that they have to put their money where their mouth is, instead of just calling from the dugouts?

The Sino-Japanese Dynamic?

As far as the Sino-Japanese dynamic is concerned Hatoyama has potential to heal old divisions, but also to open new ones.

On one side Hatoyama has made a number public statements aimed at soothing Sino-Japanese relations, including distancing himself from the controversial Yasukuni Jinja. With Hatoyama criticizing members of the LDP for visiting the shrine in the face of China's objections, and stating bluntly that neither he nor any member of his cabinet will visit the Shrine so long as convicted war criminal's names are included alongside other war dead.

For it's part the Mainland has publicly acknowledged these statements and has publicly stated that they are a correct approach. Something that Beijing will have a hard time going back on at a later date, and would loose much face if it did.

On the other side, if Hatoyama's public statements regarding regional intentions are anything to go by, they have equal potential to tighten the Sino-Japanese relationship, or to split it even further apart. With the eventual outcome depending heavily on Hatoyama's execution.

Chief amongst the issue with the potential to heal or harm is Hatoyama's stated desire for Japan to move away from US centric economic and foreign policies, and look closer to home.

Looking Closer to Home?

Hatoyama has been a vocal critic of Japan's economic dependency on the US, and of America's policy of unrestricted capitalism. Going further than most Japanese politicians to lay the blame for the current financial crisis on America's doorstep, and directly accusing the US of causing the economic situation by refusing to regulate or reign in risky businesses and business practices.

According to Hatoyam, Japan needs to develop stronger trading ties with other Asian nations, and to develop mutual regional interests which can allow the Asian economy to sustain itself independently of the big Western economies.

On the face of things a policy of looking locally before looking globally, and of developing stronger regional cooperation through trade and investment, could be a boon for the Sino-Japanese relationship. Bringing stronger business ties, greater cultural and economic exchanges, and shared interests that giving politicians more incentives to work together and to resolve disputes amicably.

However, if the Hatoyama administration becomes too bullish in seeking tighter relationships with China's neighbors, or if it seeks to too much of a leadership role in its dealings with China, it could lead to a nationalist backlash on the Mainland. With Chinese nationalists becoming fearful that a resurgent Japan with an increasing eye on Asia could attempt to launch what amounts to a hostile takeover of Asia. Doing with investment and economics what Imperial Japan attempted to do with bullets.

If Japan becomes too economically close to China's neighbors Beijing and/or Chinese nationalists may feel that it is being crowded out, and that Japan is attempting to form a cartel against it. But if Japan takes too much interest in China then the same said people may feel that Japan is attempting to buy a controlling interest in the Mainland with the aim of turning it into a sub division of Japan PLC.

While this may sound far fetched, particularly given that Hatoyama hasn't even officially entered office, Chinese nationalists are particularly jumpy as far as Japan is concerned, and have overreacted to many previous situations. Creating much tension in the Sino-Japanese dynamic and fostering mutual distrust that still haunts both countries and which still hampers closer social and economic ties.

The Final Verdict?

At present, the final verdict remains very much a case of wait and see. Too early to reach a verdict. Too early, even, to accurately guess at what a verdict might be.

Will Hatoyama bring Japan and China closer together through shared economic interests? Will their stance on Sino-Japanese issues such as Yasukuni Jinja give the Mainland the chance that it needs to rehabilitate Sino-Japanese ties? Or will Hatoyama's policies of Asian engagement leave China feeling squeezed out, or brought up, and great further tension?

Some even suggest that it might not even be any of the above issues that set the tone for future Sino-Japanese relations, but that it could instead be Hatoyama's stated intention to renegotiate the continued occupation of Japanese territory by the US military.

At present there are somewhere in the region of 50,000 US military personal within Japan's territorial sphere. Notably, many are based on the Island of Japanese Okinawa. China's metaphoric backyard.

For China, this is the equivalent of the USSR, at the hight of its power, maintaining a forward strike base on Cuba.

Were Hatoyama to force a reduction in US forces on Japanese soil it could serve as a bridge to Chinese. With people seeing it as an act of kinship with Mainland nationalists: With Japan “Throwing off the shackles of foreign occupiers”. However, other's could also see it as a reduction in the obstacles faced by the Mainland should it decide to “reunite” the Mainland with the disputed island of Chinese Taiwan by force. It could even be seen by as a weakening of Japan's defenses in the even of a Sino-Chinese conflict.

Current opinion is that there is unlikely to be much change in this particular area. With Hatoyama talking a good fight as the political opposition, but being reluctant to rock the boat too much with the US. Which remains a key political and economic partner. Though current opinion has been wrong in the past.

tags: japan  election  china  

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