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One rule for everybody: Beijing says no to unequal non-proliferation agreement
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posted Wednesday, 7 September 2005
In a move that was not entirely unexpected, representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs have confirmed this week that, in line with Beijing’s commitment to maintaining an independent foreign policy based on its world view taking precedence over external world views, it is to remain outside of a controversial US initiated arms control treaty known as the Proliferation Security Initiative that many see as being unequal, and as skating on the edges of legality.
Stressing that Beijing preferred a solution based on a multi-national approach centered on the strengthening of existing international laws, over the forming of extra judicial ‘alliances’, Beijing stated that, while it supported activities to prevent the proliferation of prohibited weapons and weapons components as embodied by PSI, it had strong misgivings over initiative; including questions over the its enforcement and legality of PSI. Beijing also called on existing and futures signatories to PSI to ‘act with ‘caution’.
The announcement of Beijing’s position regarding was made on Thursday during the airing of a new Chinese governmental white-paper on anti-proliferation activities which stressed that non-proliferation activities should be an inclusive multi-national process.
Despite not signing up to PSI, Beijing did acknowledge the need for stronger non-proliferation activities to prevent dangerous technologies and substances from spreading across the globe.
The Proliferation Security Initiative?
At its most basic level, PSI is an agreement by signatories to share intelligence and resources to aid in the interdiction of cargoes suspected to contain dangerous or proscribed item which provide a framework for increased international co-operation in the detection and seizure of ‘prohibited’ materials at a global level.
PSI is chiefly concerned with the prevention of the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons technologies and components, and their delivery systems.
However, while PSI compels signatories to enact legislation to assist in the seizure of prohibited items through their ports and territories, it carries no legal weight under the international law and does not allow signatories greater power or legal authority in regions over which no Government exercise sovereign control.
There are currently 15 full signatories to PSI:
America, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain.
In addition to the signatories, approximately 40 nations have offered ranging from assistance in carrying out interdictions to diplomatic and intelligence support.
Controversy
Though broadly agreed to be an important measure in combating arms proliferation, PSI has drawn widespread commentary, ranging from concern to criticism, from both national governments and non-governmental organizations because it operates on the fringes of international law and has the potential to draw signatory nations into obligations that see them bend or break international law, and into situations where they may be compelled to act with little of no proof except the say-so of a foreign intelligence agency.
Furthering the controversy over PSI are strong concerns that it may have a US bias, with American foreign policy serving dictat over which cargoes are considered proscribed and which states are considered to be involved in proliferation activities.
These concerns were earlier highlighted by indications from former Under-secretary of State John Bolton, a chief architect of PSI, that Washington would shield nations friendly to the US from PSI enforcement while ensuring that interdictions were carried out against nations that the US considers ‘unfriendly’.
Such a policy by the US could see nuclear capable aggressor and former aggressor nations; including Britain and Israel, being freely allowed to trade in nuclear, chemical and missile technologies because of their close ties to the US, while non-hostile nations with anti-US governments; including Cuba and Libya, were subjected to enforcement actions on shipments of so-called duel use technologies that may be intended for legitimate civilian use.
Many of China’s the concerns over PSI and the process of enforcing non-proliferation activities are embodied by an earlier (Pre PSI) incident in which a joint US-Spanish taskforce intercepted and stormed a Cambodian registered cargo vessel, the So San, which was transporting chemical agents and missile components from North Korea to Yemen. The seizure took place in international waters and was later ruled to be in breach of international law.
In accordance with the ruling, the vessel was released and allowed to deliver its cargo, causing extreme embarrassment for the United States, and leading observers to question whether the US was abusing its world influence, and whether Washington was using the war on terror as a pretext for other American agendas, including the isolation of nations that refuse to comply with US demands.
During the seizure, armed Special Forces boarded the ship, detained its crew at gunpoint and seized its cargo. Under normal conditions, these are commonly referred to as piracy and kidnapping.
To date, the US has refused to release a full account of seizures made under, and in relation to, PSI making it impossible to judge its effectiveness or viability; or to hold its instigators to full account for abuses of international law committed under it.
China, Taiwan and North Korea, and PSI?
Due to its US Foreign Policy slant, PSI raises a number of awkward issues for China in regards to Chinese-Taiwan and North Korea. Particularly as to whether regional signatories, including Japan and the US, would honor PSI when it came to shipments of weapons to Chinese-Taiwan, and whether they would hold double standards against North Korea.
Were China to request, for example, that the US interdict a shipment of long ranged missiles from France to Chinese-Taiwan, it is unlikely that the US would comply on the grounds that the it would consider the shipment to be a legitimate. However, if the same shipment were bound for North Korea, it is likely that the US would invoke PSI and put highly public pressure China into honoring its commitments.
Won’t, or Can’t?
Although Beijing has publicly voiced a number of valid concerns in regards to PSI, some China watchers have pointed towards another, less obvious, reason that may have helped to secure China’s reluctance to sign; without signing Beijing can play the ‘won’t’ card when it comes to requests by the US to interdict ships but, if it were to sign, there might to situations when Beijing might have to admit that won’t might instead be ‘can’t’.
Despite possessing one of the world’s largest armed forced there are questions among China watchers as to China’s actually ability to carry out any commitments that it makes to halting the shipment of suspect cargoes under PSI.
By international standards, China’s maritime boundaries are considered to be highly porous, and its armed forces lacking in the long-range maritime interdiction capabilities necessary to successfully act against even conventional smugglers. Meaning that, where china to sign, it may be publicly shown to be unable to carry out its obligations; situation considered unacceptable to Beijing.
Stressing that Beijing preferred a solution based on a multi-national approach centered on the strengthening of existing international laws, over the forming of extra judicial ‘alliances’, Beijing stated that, while it supported activities to prevent the proliferation of prohibited weapons and weapons components as embodied by PSI, it had strong misgivings over initiative; including questions over the its enforcement and legality of PSI. Beijing also called on existing and futures signatories to PSI to ‘act with ‘caution’.
|
|
“PSI has so far failed to completely exclude the possibility of
interdiction operations beyond the framework of current international
law; that is where China and other countries concerned lies, as well as
the major reason why those countries have not joined the PSI. We hope
the participating countries to PSI will seriously take into
consideration these concerns and act with caution” Zhang Yan, Director General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China |
|
The announcement of Beijing’s position regarding was made on Thursday during the airing of a new Chinese governmental white-paper on anti-proliferation activities which stressed that non-proliferation activities should be an inclusive multi-national process.
|
|
"The issue of non-proliferation should be dealt with by political and
diplomatic means within the framework of international law." 'China`s Endeavors of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation', White Paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China. |
|
Despite not signing up to PSI, Beijing did acknowledge the need for stronger non-proliferation activities to prevent dangerous technologies and substances from spreading across the globe.
|
|
"The international non-proliferation process is facing challenges. The
prospect for settling regional nuclear issues is still blurry and the
risks of terrorist organizations and other non-state entities acquiring
weapons of mass destruction are growing." 'China`s Endeavors of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation' |
|
The Proliferation Security Initiative?
At its most basic level, PSI is an agreement by signatories to share intelligence and resources to aid in the interdiction of cargoes suspected to contain dangerous or proscribed item which provide a framework for increased international co-operation in the detection and seizure of ‘prohibited’ materials at a global level.
PSI is chiefly concerned with the prevention of the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons technologies and components, and their delivery systems.
However, while PSI compels signatories to enact legislation to assist in the seizure of prohibited items through their ports and territories, it carries no legal weight under the international law and does not allow signatories greater power or legal authority in regions over which no Government exercise sovereign control.
|
|
“PSI does not grant governments any new legal authority to conduct
interdictions in international waters or airspace. Such interdictions
may take place, but they must be confined to what is currently
permissible under international law.” The Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp |
|
There are currently 15 full signatories to PSI:
America, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain.
In addition to the signatories, approximately 40 nations have offered ranging from assistance in carrying out interdictions to diplomatic and intelligence support.
Controversy
Though broadly agreed to be an important measure in combating arms proliferation, PSI has drawn widespread commentary, ranging from concern to criticism, from both national governments and non-governmental organizations because it operates on the fringes of international law and has the potential to draw signatory nations into obligations that see them bend or break international law, and into situations where they may be compelled to act with little of no proof except the say-so of a foreign intelligence agency.
|
|
“[A Ship] cannot be stopped simply because it is suspected of transporting WMD or related goods.” The Arms Control Association |
|
Furthering the controversy over PSI are strong concerns that it may have a US bias, with American foreign policy serving dictat over which cargoes are considered proscribed and which states are considered to be involved in proliferation activities.
These concerns were earlier highlighted by indications from former Under-secretary of State John Bolton, a chief architect of PSI, that Washington would shield nations friendly to the US from PSI enforcement while ensuring that interdictions were carried out against nations that the US considers ‘unfriendly’.
Such a policy by the US could see nuclear capable aggressor and former aggressor nations; including Britain and Israel, being freely allowed to trade in nuclear, chemical and missile technologies because of their close ties to the US, while non-hostile nations with anti-US governments; including Cuba and Libya, were subjected to enforcement actions on shipments of so-called duel use technologies that may be intended for legitimate civilian use.
Many of China’s the concerns over PSI and the process of enforcing non-proliferation activities are embodied by an earlier (Pre PSI) incident in which a joint US-Spanish taskforce intercepted and stormed a Cambodian registered cargo vessel, the So San, which was transporting chemical agents and missile components from North Korea to Yemen. The seizure took place in international waters and was later ruled to be in breach of international law.
|
|
"we had no legal basis to seize the cargo," Ari Fleischer, White House spokesperson |
|
In accordance with the ruling, the vessel was released and allowed to deliver its cargo, causing extreme embarrassment for the United States, and leading observers to question whether the US was abusing its world influence, and whether Washington was using the war on terror as a pretext for other American agendas, including the isolation of nations that refuse to comply with US demands.
During the seizure, armed Special Forces boarded the ship, detained its crew at gunpoint and seized its cargo. Under normal conditions, these are commonly referred to as piracy and kidnapping.
To date, the US has refused to release a full account of seizures made under, and in relation to, PSI making it impossible to judge its effectiveness or viability; or to hold its instigators to full account for abuses of international law committed under it.
China, Taiwan and North Korea, and PSI?
Due to its US Foreign Policy slant, PSI raises a number of awkward issues for China in regards to Chinese-Taiwan and North Korea. Particularly as to whether regional signatories, including Japan and the US, would honor PSI when it came to shipments of weapons to Chinese-Taiwan, and whether they would hold double standards against North Korea.
Were China to request, for example, that the US interdict a shipment of long ranged missiles from France to Chinese-Taiwan, it is unlikely that the US would comply on the grounds that the it would consider the shipment to be a legitimate. However, if the same shipment were bound for North Korea, it is likely that the US would invoke PSI and put highly public pressure China into honoring its commitments.
Won’t, or Can’t?
Although Beijing has publicly voiced a number of valid concerns in regards to PSI, some China watchers have pointed towards another, less obvious, reason that may have helped to secure China’s reluctance to sign; without signing Beijing can play the ‘won’t’ card when it comes to requests by the US to interdict ships but, if it were to sign, there might to situations when Beijing might have to admit that won’t might instead be ‘can’t’.
Despite possessing one of the world’s largest armed forced there are questions among China watchers as to China’s actually ability to carry out any commitments that it makes to halting the shipment of suspect cargoes under PSI.
By international standards, China’s maritime boundaries are considered to be highly porous, and its armed forces lacking in the long-range maritime interdiction capabilities necessary to successfully act against even conventional smugglers. Meaning that, where china to sign, it may be publicly shown to be unable to carry out its obligations; situation considered unacceptable to Beijing.
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