The North Korea Question

When Chinese premier Hu Jintao came to power, Beijing promised that China was on a path to liberalization, and that it would allow increased freedom of speech. However, in the years that followed, Beijing has increased its efforts to crackdown on dissent, and has put in place one of the most sophisticatedly Internet blocking and policing systems in the world.

Later, when China was awarded the 2008 Olympic games, Beijing promise unprecedented openness and access for foreign media. It then redoubled efforts against dissidents to ensure that there is nothing for the foreign press to see when they arrive.

This month a Chinese spokesperson has announced that Beijing is 'absolutely against' the prospect of a nuclear armed North Korea and that it would do all that it could to draw Pyongyang onto the non-proliferation path. Given Beijing's past record, should we take this statement at face value?

Unusually, in this instance at least, the answer might just be yes. A key sign of this is appointment of Liu Xiaoming as the Chinese ambassador to the isolated Asian state.

Unlike China's previous representatives to North Korea Liu little experience with Sino-Asian affairs. He has also not played any significant part in the Sino-North Korean relationship, and he has no personal stakes sino-North Korean politics. Making him among the least pro-north Korean ambassador that china has yet appoint, and the most likely, so far, to take serious steps towards reigning North Korean activities.

As well as being an experience diplomat, Liu is also an expert in US relations, with experience in communications and fence mending between Beijing and Washington.

This has lead some China watchers to speculate that Beijing might now be willing to take a more direct approach to the US-North Korean situation, and to have specifically appointed Liu so that he could advise North Korea on how to correctly read and respond to US rhetoric, and on how to conduct their affairs without upsetting the US any more than strictly necessary.

When pressed on the topic, Beijing denied suggestions that Liu's history in Sino-US relations meant that he would be actively advising North Korea on how best to manage its relationship with America. Saying instead that Liu would work with North Korea on China's behalf, but that he wouldn't be exerting any influence beyond of his role as ambassador.

“Ambassador Liu Xiaoming has long worked on China-US relations and once posted in the US. But if your conclusion is drawn on this basis, I am afraid it is not accurate” Qin Gang, Spokesperson, Foreign Ministry, China.

Even if Liu is will not be actively involved in US-North Korean affairs, his experience in Sino-US diplomacy is likely to be an asset to China in multi-party negotiations.

"Liu's experience will be helpful in enhancing the triangle communications among China, North Korea and the US" Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations, People's University, Beijing.

Liu Xiaoming?

Born in 1956, Liu and is a conservative who is affiliated with nationalist elements in Beijing. He is the former deputy director-general of Ministry of Foreign Affair's “North American and Oceania Affairs department” and has held two senior positions at China's US embassy.

Nuclear Concerns?

Although China has offered North Korea a great deal of political and economic support since its inception, and has frequently defied US foreign policy in its dealing with its fellow communist state, many analysts see it as being highly unlikely that Beijing would welcome the prospect of a nuclear armed North Korea, and even more unlikely that it would actively assist the North in developing either nuclear weapons, or the launch platforms necessary to carry them beyond Korea's borders, because of the 'difficulties' that a nuclear armed North Korea could cause for China.

A nuclear armed North Korea would draw 'unnecessary attention' to the Asia Pacific region, and could potentially instigate an arms race, particularly if it tipped the political balance in non-nuclear Japan: pushing it to begin its own nuclear program, or if it encouraged South Korea and Japan to invest heavily in anti-missile defenses systems.

Prospects?

While the prospect of a nuclear North Korea poses many long term problems, Beijing attention is likely to be focused on the two key periods either side of North Korea's nuclear boundary; the point at which it is confirmed that North Korea has nuclear capabilities.

Recriminations?

The first of these periods of concern is most worrying from a political perspective, and is the time immediately after the detonation of North Korea's first bomb.

During this time, the level of fear will be at its highest, and so will the risk that members of the international community could be panicked into making rash decisions. Equal to this is the fear that overseas conservative elements could hijacked the situation and use the resulting international confusion to:

1) Gain popular domestic support by branding their less conservative rivals as being weak on non-proliferation
2) Accuse countries that have urged a more moderate approach towards North Korea of 'allowing' North Korea to develop nuclear capabilities by persistently blocking conservative efforts to restrain the Pyongyang.
3) Accuse rival states of supplying North Korea with nuclear technology
4) Accuse rival states of trying to buy North Korean nuclear technology

As one of North Korea's key allies, China is likely to take the brunt of conservative accusations.

From Beijing's perspective, any accusations, or increased conservative power in foreign governments, could substantially 'muddy' the political water for China. Leading to increased Sino-global tension that would make it far hard harder for China to maintain a favorable international image, and potentially even to the imposition of sanctions or trade restrictions by conservative administrations.

Primarily, such concerns revolve around the already conservative government in Washington, which is host to a number of powerful China-hostile elements, and the moderate government in Japan, which is facing renewed threats from conservatives with a history of using the so-called China Threat as a recruiting tool.

There are also concerns over the reaction of the South Korean government and, to a lesser extent, the governments the European nations.

Drastic Measures?

The second of these times is most worrying from a military perspective, and is any period in which it appears as if North Korea is on the verge of perfecting a workable nuclear weapon, but has not yet done so.

During such a time there is likely to be a strong call from overseas conservative elements for distinct action to be taken to prevent North Korea from developing the Bomb.

These calls would likely include demands for a preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities. Any strike against North Korea would, at best, destabilize the region and, at worst, lead to a full scale nuclear war on China's border.

Deadlock

Ongoing 6 nation Non-proliferation, aimed at drawing North Korea away from a nuclear path became deadlocked in November 2005, due to a disagreements over the scope of discussions.

North Korea refused to participate further unless the scope of negotiations was widened to include other, non-nuclear, topics. Including the issue of sanctions that have been laid against international groups who have defied the US by trading with the isolated Asian state. While the US has refused to link the issue of third party sanctions to nuclear negotiations, and declined to offer the North any solid incentives to give up its nuclear program. Instead offering further sanctions if the North did not comply.

Missed Opportunity?

Prior to the breakdown of talks, North Korea offered to suspend a number of its nuclear/missile related activities in exchange for a mutual non aggression pact with the US.

Such a pact would have removed the threat to the US from North Korea's weapon, but would also have made it legally impossible for the Washington to launch any form of preemptive strike against North Korea, and would have prevented it from engineer regime change as it has previously done in states such as Iraq and Guatemala.

At the time that the offer was made, North Korea's nuclear program and missile capabilities were less advanced than they are today, and they were not considered to pose such a threat to the US. Leading Washington to turned the North down.

(Un)willing Partner?

At present, China is bound by a “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” with North Korea. Signed in 1961 this treaty compels China to act in North Korea's defense if it is threatened by an outside force.

Beijing recently reaffirmed its commitment to upholding the treaty.

“This year marks the 45th anniversary of Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the DPRK. The treaty has played an important role in promoting friendship and cooperation between China and the DPRK. China will continue to work with the DPRK in the treaty's spirit to put forward the development of bilateral good-neighborly and friendly cooperation and safeguard regional peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula is the departure point from which China handles the issues on the Korean Peninsula. China is ready to make concerted effort with other parties.” Qin Gang (5 September 2006)

tags: china  america  north korea  nuclear proliferation  nuclear non proliferation  liu xiaoming  

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