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Yasukuni Shrine: A Problem With No Single Solution
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News and Politics :: Sino-Japanese :: Human rights and personal freedoms :: News and Perspectives ::
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posted Tuesday, 1 November 2005
Yasukuni Shrine; the site of Japan's national war memorial, is probably not only one of the greatest bumps on the road to peaceful Sino-Japanese co-existence, but also one of the most controversial shrine in the modern age, but, if the latest developments in Tokyo bear fruit, its days might finally be number.
After many years of public and private debate, and nearly 25 years of protests by neighboring China, it has been announced that Tokyo is to form a cross party committee of 100+ lawmakers, drawn from all sides of Japan's political system, to once and for all deal with the thorny issue of providing Japan with an internationally acceptable national war memorial that is free of the controversies that have wracked Yasukuni.
The formation of the new committee, titled the "group of pushing forward establishment of national memorial facility" was announced on Friday after Japan's ruling coalition, lead by Prime Minister 小泉's (Koizumi’s) center right 自由民主党 (Liberal Democratic party), met with the left leaning opposition 民主党 (Democratic Party). The committee is scheduled to convene on 9 November to debate how best to push forward the dream of creating of a war memorial that is acceptable both to domestic and international audiences. However, as with most contentious issues, the path to a resolution is not expected to be easy.
Even as officials prepares to debate what should be done to resolve 'the Yasukuni problem' some serious questions are being asked by delegates and observers alike. Questions that stretch far beyond the debate over what shape any new war memorial should take, and which include whether would China ever be prepared to see whatever 'solution' eventually emerges as being acceptable, no matter what form it took? And as to whether the construction of a new memorial might actually make things worse, rather than better?
Three Tenets
Though there are many different issues to be debated, and many different factions within Japan and China to be considered, in order to win the approval of the widest possible audience, any solution to 'the Yasukuni problem' would likely have to follow three basic tenets.
Tenet 1: Clean Break
The new memorial should be 'clean' remembering only 'ordinary' soldiers; Soldiers who were not convicted of committing or ordering war crimes.
Tenet 2: Clear Boundaries
The new memorial should be secular so as not to fall foul of Article 20 of the Japanese constitution; which prohibits the convergence of church and state, and to give the state a greater measure of control over the memorial; allowing memorial affairs to be linked to the need to preserve international relation in a way not currently possible with Yasukuni.
Tenet 3: Remembrance before glory
The new memorial should be solely for the purposes of remembering the dead, and the promotion of peace through the remembrance of loss and sacrifice. It should not justify, glorify or otherwise promote acts of aggression or those who perpetrated them.
Though apparently simple, each of these tenets in turn raises many questions and potential pitfalls, and must take into account the views of divergent groups with different arguments as to what they see as a viable solution.
Remembering the guilty?
One of the key hopes, voiced by proponents of a new national memorial, is that by constructing a memorial that does not name convicted war criminals, a clear line can be drawn between the remembrance of ‘ordinary’ war dead and activities that include, or are aimed at, convicted war criminals: allowing people to perform acts of remembrance that cannot be misrepresented as acts of glorification, and resulting in a shrine that is free of much of Yasukuni's controversy.
Observers have however pointed out that removing the legacy of war criminals is not as simple as excluding the names of those convicted of war crimes from war memorials. A situation that largely exists because there are a number of different groups, within both in Japan and China, that hold different individuals to be guilty or innocent, and which express various contradictory opinions on what they see as an acceptable solution.
Three clear examples of this complication are the issues surrounding Chinese war crimes tribunals, American interference, and Japan's hierarchical system.
After WWII, China conducted thirteen war crimes tribunals. These tribunals tried a total of 650 cases and resulted in 504 convictions. 149 of which resulted in the imposition of the death penalty.
Critics have however claimed that China's tribunals were bias and that they required a lower standard of proof from modern tribunals; leading them to have been unfairly weighed against Japanese defendants and resulting in people being wrongly convicted of war crimes, or being convicted of a crime that they merely observed, but which they neither ordered nor could have prevented.
Conversely, watchers of both China and Japan have voiced that China's war crimes tribunals were hampered by a lack of evidence in relation to who was guilty of what, by uneven access to those accused of war crimes, and by poor accounts of some war crimes brought about by poor communications and the fact that many of the potential witnesses were dead. Leading to some Japanese war criminals escaping punishment, and potentially being unjustly listed on a 'clean' memorial alongside regular soldiers.
Another factor effecting the definition of war criminals is the fact that the US is known to have 'recruited' many Japanese into its ranks after the war; offering them amnesty in exchange for often gruesome information that America could use to further its own ends.
The most obvious example of this was when Washington directly interfered in the process of post war justice by illegally giving amnesty to several 'would be' notorious war criminals who were part of Japan's chemical and biological warfare units; offering them their lives and freedom in exchange for records on the murderous campaigns that they had been conducting against the Chinese. This interference allowed many war criminals to escape trial, and would technically allow them to be named on a 'clean' memorial despite their actual guilt.
Similarly, Washington is known to have offered full or partial amnesty to a number of German war criminals in exchange for their assistance in developing the rocketry systems.
The last of the main complications is that wartime Japan maintained a system that was split between the country's traditional hierarchical and a conventional power based system. This system meant that some of those convicted of criminals may have been symbolic figures who existed only to 'sign and stamp' decisions made by the power base, and that some of those who were convicted may have been 'stand ins' who took the blame in order to spare senior members of the hierarchy or power base who committed war crimes. Both of which arguably mean that any number of guilty men may have escaped the tribunals, while innocent ones were found guilty in their place.
It is throughout highly unlikely that China would fully accept a new memorial if it believed that guilty men were named there, or that Japanese nationalists and nationalist leaning moderates would fully accept it if they believed that innocent men were excluded from it because of these disagreements. Further complicating matters, and making the finding of a solution that would be acceptable to all parties almost impossible.
Contrary beliefs promulgated by some, Japan and the Japanese Government bear no responsibility for war criminals escaping justice. As a defeated nation that surrendered unconditionally, Japan played no formal part in the trial of its own war criminals. Guilt or innocence was determined by tribunals conducted wholly by China and the western allies, and not by Japanese courts.
Similarly, Germany war criminals were not tried by German courts, but by an international tribunal over which Germany itself held no control.
Shrine or Memorial?
Over the years, there have been many calls for Tokyo to deal with 'the Yasukuni problem'. However, many of these calls, particularly those from foreigners, failed to take into account the fact that the Yasukuni war memorial was built inside a religious shrine, putting it, for the most part, beyond direct state intervention.
This situation exists because, after WWII, Japan adopted a strong pacifist constitution that guaranteed the separation of Church and state. Preventing one from interfering, or influencing, the running of the other.
This clause, and a number of related laws outside of the constitution, were originally written to prevent subsequent Japanese governments from using religion as a political tool and religious bodies from wielding political power, as had been done during WWII, as well as to prevent the state from interfering in free religious expression. Unfortunately, these laws have also prevented successive Japanese administrations from imposing a solution on Yasukuni, or from acting directly against nationalist minority agitators who sought to infiltrate the shrine for their own ends.
The trouble caused by this divergence of control was most recently highlighted in June of 2005, when senior lawmakers from Japan’s ruling coalition, speaking in response to strong protests from China, tabled that the names of the most notorious war criminals should be taken from the national war memorial in Yasukuni and moved to a separate location.
Citing laws prohibiting state interference in religious matters, nationalists and religious elements within the shrine refused to comply. Leaving the Government powerless to act.
Such a separation of church and state is not unique to Japan. As Tokyo has no power to intercede in the running of Yasukuni, so the governments of most western democracies have no power over intercede in the affairs of churches, temples, mosques or synagogues. As with Tokyo, most also have no ability to replace religious leaders if they are found to harbor views that go against national policy or harm foreign relations, and have no legal authority with which they can demand the removal of a convicted war criminal from a religious cemetery or memorial in their own countries.
Owing to the problems caused by Yasukuni’s protected status, it is thought highly likely that any replacement would take the form of a secular memorial rather a new shrine. Allowing Tokyo to have the last word on inclusion, leaderships and image.
Designating a new war memorial as being secular, and placing it outside of a religious site, would have the added advantage of creating a clear distinction between religious and non religious activities that is not possible with Yasukuni, and would additionally remove one of the main weaknesses in the international perception of Yasukuni; that currently it is almost impossible to determine who is visiting the shrine because it is an prominent shrine, who is visiting it because it is a war memorial, and who is visiting it with nationalist intents.
The suggestion that a new national memorial might not be a shrine has predictably not been without its critics. Some have questioning whether religious ceremonies in remembrance of the dead would be permitted on a secular site, and as to whether relatives, particularly older more traditional relatives, of those named would be happy offering remembrance for the dead at secular memorial rather than a religious one.
Suggestions of a secular memorial also do not to sit well with many of Japan’s Buddhist and Shinto priests.
Japan does one thing, but China sees another.
While there are a great many physical problems with Yasukuni that must be addressed in order to promote Sino-Japanese reconciliation, one of the greatest problems is that Chinese perceptions of Yasukuni vary greatly from Japanese perceptions of Yasukuni. Making it very difficult for the two sides to see eye to eye; meaning that what China perceives as happening does not always mesh with what Japan is doing, and the symbolism of an event seen through Japanese eyes can appear to be very different when seen through the Chinese understanding of events.
As such, there are a great deal of misconceptions about Yasukuni in China, and the task of ensuring that these misconceptions are not merely transferred to the new memorial is likely to be a large hurdle for Tokyo. Unfortunately, Japan has a very poor record in this direction.
When faced with criticism based on ignorance or a cultural misunderstanding, Tokyo has a tendency to withdraw and refuse to engage in any kind of resolutionary dialogue. This often leads to the promulgation of myths that could have been excised through dialogue, and to accusations that a problem is being ignored or denied.
Tokyo also has a record of basing any new apologies or rebuttals on prior statements which themselves were not excepted at the time that they were made. A move which seems logical and acceptable in Japanese culture because it does not break consensus, but which brings leaves little room for diplomatic manoeuvring and, again, leads to accusations that a problem is being ignored or denied.
Additionally, owing to the Chinese concept of face; under which form and image are considered to be as important, if not more so, than substance, dealing with conflicts of understanding with China it is often best undertaken from a lower stance that allows China to gain face and to come away from any divergence of interests with something that it can play to be a victory even if it is not. Conversely to this logic, Japanese responses to Chinese issues over Yasukuni and related issues have often been made using neutral Japanese parlance and have often cited Japan’s current stance as being a version of its past stance. Leaving China with few avenues to gain face except to modify its tone to make it appear stronger than its opponent. This leads to unnecessary confrontations and a poor resolution rate.
Owing to this lack of constructive dialog, many Chinese harbor inaccurate perception about Yasukuni that have been promoted by Chinese nationalists, and reinforced by Japanese nationalists.
Current Misconceptions include that Buddhist like ancestor worship is carried out at Yasukuni and that the Shrine glorifies war dead, rather than mourns their loss.
A lack of understanding of Japanese culture and Yasukuni’s true purpose also means that many in China are also either unable or unwilling to distinguish between shrine attendance for festivals and religious reasons that are unconnected to war dead, and those that are, and those that are aimed at ‘ordinary’ soldier but not at the war criminals who make up a fractional minority of those named there.
These misconceptions and misunderstandings are often aggravated further because those who do speak up the most are often from Japan’s discredited nationalist minority, who have a vested interest in souring Sino-Japanese relations, so as to promulgate their own combative ideologies, and Chinese nationalists, who have a similar self serving agenda.
Counter Productive
Flying in the face of many domestic and international opinions, that addressing the issue of Yasukuni by building a 'clean' memorial would help to ease tensions between the two Asian neighbors, some observers have voice a strong fear that the dedication a new memorial may actually end up inflaming the Sino-Japanese relationship rather than improving it.
In the deference of their views, observers have advised that the dedication of a new memorial could potentially provoke a serious backlash among Japanese nationalist who say that the new memorial goes to far, and among Chinese nationalists who say that the memorial does not go far enough.
Some observers have voiced that that, if an alternative was constructed, Japanese nationalists would likely step up their efforts to promote Yasukuni, and that the construction of a new memorial could potentially act as a highly effective recruiting call; lending apparent credence to nationalist claims that Tokyo was 'surrendering Japanese dignity to appease a hostile foreign power'.
Drawing from history, it has been proven time and again, where nationalist elements are concerned, that the banning or removal of symbols, or attempts to replace them with less symbolic elements, often serves to fuel nationalism rather than to reduce it. This particularly true if said nationalist symbols are either with associated 'a time of pride and strength' or where they can be associated with a loss that is being denied. Both of which could be said to be true of Yasukuni.
This phenomena has been extremely evident in post war Germany, where efforts to eradicate nationalism have actually lead to its increase in some areas, and where efforts to eradicate the Nazi legacy by banning its symbols, and acting to suppress Nazi activities, have been used by as rallying cries to recruit successive generations of Nazi.
Additionally, observers have also warned that that Chinese nationalists, many of whom base their arguments on the contorted perceptions that Japan is a hostile nation, may reject any new memorial outright; saying that it does not sufficiently address the problems created by Yasukuni, and that the new site is little more than a smokescreen designed to allow Japan to fool outsiders into thinking that it had acquiesced.
If this were to happen, Sino-Japanese relations would not only be faced with the spectre of Yasukuni, but also claims that Tokyo had tried to whitewash the issue by creating an insubstantial replacement to allow it 'to carry on as before' while saying that it wasn't.
Concerns over a backlash form Chinese nationalists, who do not accept that a new memorial is a clean break from Yasukuni, are seen as being particularly valid by some because of the international opinion that many nationalists in China have ‘internalized’ mindsets with regards to Japan and Yasukuni; mindsets that would remain fixed regardless of any action taken by Tokyo.
In such cases, even an unconditional surrender to all demands may be seen as insufficient or insincere by Chinese nationalists, and would hold the potential to cause a volatile backlash similar in type and scale to the anti-Japanese riots witnessed earlier in 2005.
Side Issues?
It is not yet clear if any new national memorial would include only Japanese soldiers, or it would include 'subjects of Japan'; soldiers drawn from Chinese Taiwan (Then Formosa), and the Korean Peninsular, during Japanese rule.
In some cases, the inclusion of ‘subject of Japan’ in Yasukuni has been welcomed by relatives of the dead, and in other cases it has been decried.
Nationalists and seperatists in Chinese-Taiwan have additionally been known to have used the inclusion of Taiwanese in Yasakuni in their effort to draw Japan in between China and the island. Using the controversial shrine to try and form links of solidarity between Chinese-Taiwan and nationalists in Japan.
These moves have been decried as being 'dangerous' by some observers.
Coments on this entry must be approved before publication, only reasoned comments from people with open minds need apply. Those seeking to propograte nationlist Japanese or Chinese view points or to attack what they do not understand are not welcome.
After many years of public and private debate, and nearly 25 years of protests by neighboring China, it has been announced that Tokyo is to form a cross party committee of 100+ lawmakers, drawn from all sides of Japan's political system, to once and for all deal with the thorny issue of providing Japan with an internationally acceptable national war memorial that is free of the controversies that have wracked Yasukuni.
The formation of the new committee, titled the "group of pushing forward establishment of national memorial facility" was announced on Friday after Japan's ruling coalition, lead by Prime Minister 小泉's (Koizumi’s) center right 自由民主党 (Liberal Democratic party), met with the left leaning opposition 民主党 (Democratic Party). The committee is scheduled to convene on 9 November to debate how best to push forward the dream of creating of a war memorial that is acceptable both to domestic and international audiences. However, as with most contentious issues, the path to a resolution is not expected to be easy.
Even as officials prepares to debate what should be done to resolve 'the Yasukuni problem' some serious questions are being asked by delegates and observers alike. Questions that stretch far beyond the debate over what shape any new war memorial should take, and which include whether would China ever be prepared to see whatever 'solution' eventually emerges as being acceptable, no matter what form it took? And as to whether the construction of a new memorial might actually make things worse, rather than better?
Three Tenets
Though there are many different issues to be debated, and many different factions within Japan and China to be considered, in order to win the approval of the widest possible audience, any solution to 'the Yasukuni problem' would likely have to follow three basic tenets.
Tenet 1: Clean Break
The new memorial should be 'clean' remembering only 'ordinary' soldiers; Soldiers who were not convicted of committing or ordering war crimes.
Tenet 2: Clear Boundaries
The new memorial should be secular so as not to fall foul of Article 20 of the Japanese constitution; which prohibits the convergence of church and state, and to give the state a greater measure of control over the memorial; allowing memorial affairs to be linked to the need to preserve international relation in a way not currently possible with Yasukuni.
Tenet 3: Remembrance before glory
The new memorial should be solely for the purposes of remembering the dead, and the promotion of peace through the remembrance of loss and sacrifice. It should not justify, glorify or otherwise promote acts of aggression or those who perpetrated them.
Though apparently simple, each of these tenets in turn raises many questions and potential pitfalls, and must take into account the views of divergent groups with different arguments as to what they see as a viable solution.
Remembering the guilty?
One of the key hopes, voiced by proponents of a new national memorial, is that by constructing a memorial that does not name convicted war criminals, a clear line can be drawn between the remembrance of ‘ordinary’ war dead and activities that include, or are aimed at, convicted war criminals: allowing people to perform acts of remembrance that cannot be misrepresented as acts of glorification, and resulting in a shrine that is free of much of Yasukuni's controversy.
Observers have however pointed out that removing the legacy of war criminals is not as simple as excluding the names of those convicted of war crimes from war memorials. A situation that largely exists because there are a number of different groups, within both in Japan and China, that hold different individuals to be guilty or innocent, and which express various contradictory opinions on what they see as an acceptable solution.
Three clear examples of this complication are the issues surrounding Chinese war crimes tribunals, American interference, and Japan's hierarchical system.
After WWII, China conducted thirteen war crimes tribunals. These tribunals tried a total of 650 cases and resulted in 504 convictions. 149 of which resulted in the imposition of the death penalty.
Critics have however claimed that China's tribunals were bias and that they required a lower standard of proof from modern tribunals; leading them to have been unfairly weighed against Japanese defendants and resulting in people being wrongly convicted of war crimes, or being convicted of a crime that they merely observed, but which they neither ordered nor could have prevented.
Conversely, watchers of both China and Japan have voiced that China's war crimes tribunals were hampered by a lack of evidence in relation to who was guilty of what, by uneven access to those accused of war crimes, and by poor accounts of some war crimes brought about by poor communications and the fact that many of the potential witnesses were dead. Leading to some Japanese war criminals escaping punishment, and potentially being unjustly listed on a 'clean' memorial alongside regular soldiers.
Another factor effecting the definition of war criminals is the fact that the US is known to have 'recruited' many Japanese into its ranks after the war; offering them amnesty in exchange for often gruesome information that America could use to further its own ends.
The most obvious example of this was when Washington directly interfered in the process of post war justice by illegally giving amnesty to several 'would be' notorious war criminals who were part of Japan's chemical and biological warfare units; offering them their lives and freedom in exchange for records on the murderous campaigns that they had been conducting against the Chinese. This interference allowed many war criminals to escape trial, and would technically allow them to be named on a 'clean' memorial despite their actual guilt.
Similarly, Washington is known to have offered full or partial amnesty to a number of German war criminals in exchange for their assistance in developing the rocketry systems.
The last of the main complications is that wartime Japan maintained a system that was split between the country's traditional hierarchical and a conventional power based system. This system meant that some of those convicted of criminals may have been symbolic figures who existed only to 'sign and stamp' decisions made by the power base, and that some of those who were convicted may have been 'stand ins' who took the blame in order to spare senior members of the hierarchy or power base who committed war crimes. Both of which arguably mean that any number of guilty men may have escaped the tribunals, while innocent ones were found guilty in their place.
It is throughout highly unlikely that China would fully accept a new memorial if it believed that guilty men were named there, or that Japanese nationalists and nationalist leaning moderates would fully accept it if they believed that innocent men were excluded from it because of these disagreements. Further complicating matters, and making the finding of a solution that would be acceptable to all parties almost impossible.
Contrary beliefs promulgated by some, Japan and the Japanese Government bear no responsibility for war criminals escaping justice. As a defeated nation that surrendered unconditionally, Japan played no formal part in the trial of its own war criminals. Guilt or innocence was determined by tribunals conducted wholly by China and the western allies, and not by Japanese courts.
Similarly, Germany war criminals were not tried by German courts, but by an international tribunal over which Germany itself held no control.
Shrine or Memorial?
Over the years, there have been many calls for Tokyo to deal with 'the Yasukuni problem'. However, many of these calls, particularly those from foreigners, failed to take into account the fact that the Yasukuni war memorial was built inside a religious shrine, putting it, for the most part, beyond direct state intervention.
This situation exists because, after WWII, Japan adopted a strong pacifist constitution that guaranteed the separation of Church and state. Preventing one from interfering, or influencing, the running of the other.
This clause, and a number of related laws outside of the constitution, were originally written to prevent subsequent Japanese governments from using religion as a political tool and religious bodies from wielding political power, as had been done during WWII, as well as to prevent the state from interfering in free religious expression. Unfortunately, these laws have also prevented successive Japanese administrations from imposing a solution on Yasukuni, or from acting directly against nationalist minority agitators who sought to infiltrate the shrine for their own ends.
The trouble caused by this divergence of control was most recently highlighted in June of 2005, when senior lawmakers from Japan’s ruling coalition, speaking in response to strong protests from China, tabled that the names of the most notorious war criminals should be taken from the national war memorial in Yasukuni and moved to a separate location.
Citing laws prohibiting state interference in religious matters, nationalists and religious elements within the shrine refused to comply. Leaving the Government powerless to act.
Such a separation of church and state is not unique to Japan. As Tokyo has no power to intercede in the running of Yasukuni, so the governments of most western democracies have no power over intercede in the affairs of churches, temples, mosques or synagogues. As with Tokyo, most also have no ability to replace religious leaders if they are found to harbor views that go against national policy or harm foreign relations, and have no legal authority with which they can demand the removal of a convicted war criminal from a religious cemetery or memorial in their own countries.
Owing to the problems caused by Yasukuni’s protected status, it is thought highly likely that any replacement would take the form of a secular memorial rather a new shrine. Allowing Tokyo to have the last word on inclusion, leaderships and image.
Designating a new war memorial as being secular, and placing it outside of a religious site, would have the added advantage of creating a clear distinction between religious and non religious activities that is not possible with Yasukuni, and would additionally remove one of the main weaknesses in the international perception of Yasukuni; that currently it is almost impossible to determine who is visiting the shrine because it is an prominent shrine, who is visiting it because it is a war memorial, and who is visiting it with nationalist intents.
The suggestion that a new national memorial might not be a shrine has predictably not been without its critics. Some have questioning whether religious ceremonies in remembrance of the dead would be permitted on a secular site, and as to whether relatives, particularly older more traditional relatives, of those named would be happy offering remembrance for the dead at secular memorial rather than a religious one.
Suggestions of a secular memorial also do not to sit well with many of Japan’s Buddhist and Shinto priests.
Japan does one thing, but China sees another.
While there are a great many physical problems with Yasukuni that must be addressed in order to promote Sino-Japanese reconciliation, one of the greatest problems is that Chinese perceptions of Yasukuni vary greatly from Japanese perceptions of Yasukuni. Making it very difficult for the two sides to see eye to eye; meaning that what China perceives as happening does not always mesh with what Japan is doing, and the symbolism of an event seen through Japanese eyes can appear to be very different when seen through the Chinese understanding of events.
As such, there are a great deal of misconceptions about Yasukuni in China, and the task of ensuring that these misconceptions are not merely transferred to the new memorial is likely to be a large hurdle for Tokyo. Unfortunately, Japan has a very poor record in this direction.
When faced with criticism based on ignorance or a cultural misunderstanding, Tokyo has a tendency to withdraw and refuse to engage in any kind of resolutionary dialogue. This often leads to the promulgation of myths that could have been excised through dialogue, and to accusations that a problem is being ignored or denied.
Tokyo also has a record of basing any new apologies or rebuttals on prior statements which themselves were not excepted at the time that they were made. A move which seems logical and acceptable in Japanese culture because it does not break consensus, but which brings leaves little room for diplomatic manoeuvring and, again, leads to accusations that a problem is being ignored or denied.
Additionally, owing to the Chinese concept of face; under which form and image are considered to be as important, if not more so, than substance, dealing with conflicts of understanding with China it is often best undertaken from a lower stance that allows China to gain face and to come away from any divergence of interests with something that it can play to be a victory even if it is not. Conversely to this logic, Japanese responses to Chinese issues over Yasukuni and related issues have often been made using neutral Japanese parlance and have often cited Japan’s current stance as being a version of its past stance. Leaving China with few avenues to gain face except to modify its tone to make it appear stronger than its opponent. This leads to unnecessary confrontations and a poor resolution rate.
Owing to this lack of constructive dialog, many Chinese harbor inaccurate perception about Yasukuni that have been promoted by Chinese nationalists, and reinforced by Japanese nationalists.
Current Misconceptions include that Buddhist like ancestor worship is carried out at Yasukuni and that the Shrine glorifies war dead, rather than mourns their loss.
A lack of understanding of Japanese culture and Yasukuni’s true purpose also means that many in China are also either unable or unwilling to distinguish between shrine attendance for festivals and religious reasons that are unconnected to war dead, and those that are, and those that are aimed at ‘ordinary’ soldier but not at the war criminals who make up a fractional minority of those named there.
These misconceptions and misunderstandings are often aggravated further because those who do speak up the most are often from Japan’s discredited nationalist minority, who have a vested interest in souring Sino-Japanese relations, so as to promulgate their own combative ideologies, and Chinese nationalists, who have a similar self serving agenda.
Counter Productive
Flying in the face of many domestic and international opinions, that addressing the issue of Yasukuni by building a 'clean' memorial would help to ease tensions between the two Asian neighbors, some observers have voice a strong fear that the dedication a new memorial may actually end up inflaming the Sino-Japanese relationship rather than improving it.
In the deference of their views, observers have advised that the dedication of a new memorial could potentially provoke a serious backlash among Japanese nationalist who say that the new memorial goes to far, and among Chinese nationalists who say that the memorial does not go far enough.
Some observers have voiced that that, if an alternative was constructed, Japanese nationalists would likely step up their efforts to promote Yasukuni, and that the construction of a new memorial could potentially act as a highly effective recruiting call; lending apparent credence to nationalist claims that Tokyo was 'surrendering Japanese dignity to appease a hostile foreign power'.
Drawing from history, it has been proven time and again, where nationalist elements are concerned, that the banning or removal of symbols, or attempts to replace them with less symbolic elements, often serves to fuel nationalism rather than to reduce it. This particularly true if said nationalist symbols are either with associated 'a time of pride and strength' or where they can be associated with a loss that is being denied. Both of which could be said to be true of Yasukuni.
This phenomena has been extremely evident in post war Germany, where efforts to eradicate nationalism have actually lead to its increase in some areas, and where efforts to eradicate the Nazi legacy by banning its symbols, and acting to suppress Nazi activities, have been used by as rallying cries to recruit successive generations of Nazi.
Additionally, observers have also warned that that Chinese nationalists, many of whom base their arguments on the contorted perceptions that Japan is a hostile nation, may reject any new memorial outright; saying that it does not sufficiently address the problems created by Yasukuni, and that the new site is little more than a smokescreen designed to allow Japan to fool outsiders into thinking that it had acquiesced.
If this were to happen, Sino-Japanese relations would not only be faced with the spectre of Yasukuni, but also claims that Tokyo had tried to whitewash the issue by creating an insubstantial replacement to allow it 'to carry on as before' while saying that it wasn't.
Concerns over a backlash form Chinese nationalists, who do not accept that a new memorial is a clean break from Yasukuni, are seen as being particularly valid by some because of the international opinion that many nationalists in China have ‘internalized’ mindsets with regards to Japan and Yasukuni; mindsets that would remain fixed regardless of any action taken by Tokyo.
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"Once your mind-set is internalized, you develop this twisted
conception of the world, and you select what you want to see to support
your [own] understanding," Yu Maochun, Professor, US Naval Academy, Speaking after Anti-Japanese riots in China. |
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In such cases, even an unconditional surrender to all demands may be seen as insufficient or insincere by Chinese nationalists, and would hold the potential to cause a volatile backlash similar in type and scale to the anti-Japanese riots witnessed earlier in 2005.
Side Issues?
It is not yet clear if any new national memorial would include only Japanese soldiers, or it would include 'subjects of Japan'; soldiers drawn from Chinese Taiwan (Then Formosa), and the Korean Peninsular, during Japanese rule.
In some cases, the inclusion of ‘subject of Japan’ in Yasukuni has been welcomed by relatives of the dead, and in other cases it has been decried.
Nationalists and seperatists in Chinese-Taiwan have additionally been known to have used the inclusion of Taiwanese in Yasakuni in their effort to draw Japan in between China and the island. Using the controversial shrine to try and form links of solidarity between Chinese-Taiwan and nationalists in Japan.
These moves have been decried as being 'dangerous' by some observers.
Coments on this entry must be approved before publication, only reasoned comments from people with open minds need apply. Those seeking to propograte nationlist Japanese or Chinese view points or to attack what they do not understand are not welcome.
View Comments/Add a Comment (20)
1. sun bin left...
Thursday, 3 November 2005 5:05 am :: http://sun-bin.blogspot.com
This is a great recap.
2. sun bin left...
Thursday, 3 November 2005 5:16 am :: http://sun-bin.blogspot.com
So far all the complains from China have been targeted at PM visiting
Yasukuni.
There are some who complained about the existence of the shrine,
but the rationals undertand it is freedom of expression, even though theyh
hate it.
So, as long as there is no governemnt endorsement of the shrine, it is very
likely China will welcome the new alternative.
3. sun bin left...
Thursday, 3 November 2005 5:27 am :: http://sun-bin.blogspot.com
Yu Maochun quote has certain truth applicable to certain subset of the
population, in China, Taiwan and Japan.
4. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Thursday, 3 November 2005 6:11 pm
Sun Bin:
5. sun bin left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 3:04 am :: http://sun-bin.blogspot.com
Yes, there will always be. Just like we cannot stop the far-right who run
Yasukuni from doing what they do.
6. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 4:52 am :: http://angrychineseblogger.blog-city.com
Actually, Yasakuni isn't really run by far right loons. A lot of the people
there are just ordinary priests, they want the war criminals to be there
because they believe that everybody should be there without exception if
they fought for Japan. Not because they want to engage in some kind of sick
glorification of war criminals.
7. john left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 5:31 am
I suspect the Japanese want something to honor its soldiers killed during
WWII. With all the horror associated with that war due to actions of MANY
Japanese soliders, however, I don't think it anything can be done to
"honor" them.
8. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 6:12 am
John
9. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 6:21 am
You might not know this, but Yasukuni is a war shrine, not a military
memorial. It includes women and children, civilians who committed no
crimes.
10. kushibo left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 11:14 am :: http://kushibo.blogspot.com
I found your take on this quite interesting, and I will probably link to it
on my blog.
11. dishuiguanyin left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 2:47 pm
Good work ACB, good work. Very detailed analysis of many issues.
My comments are:
12. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Friday, 4 November 2005 5:06 pm
Dishuiguanyin, long time no see Dishuiguanyin-senpai.
13. dishuiguanyin left...
Saturday, 5 November 2005 6:14 pm
1)"Japan is appalling at international dialog with China". Fair enough. I
only said that they seem to be learning from the 6-party talks. And they
obviously respect Beijing enough to agree to have bi-lateral talks with the
DPRK there. I hope this signals the beginning of a period of
learning-how-to-have-a-dialogue-with-the-Chinese. (Which it must be
admitted, is a pretty difficult skill to learn for many nations.)
14. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Saturday, 5 November 2005 7:18 pm
Dishuiguanyin-senpai
15. dishuiguanyin left...
Sunday, 6 November 2005 12:17 am
Actually, CCTV International (CCTV9) has been very generous in its coverage
of liberal protests in Japan recently. We saw several protests about
that-ruddy-textbook run by Japanese people for Japanese people. We also saw
some anti-nationalist protests around the anniversary of Hiroshima. Also,
all the Japanese foreign teachers I've met in China, whilst obviously not
being your average Japanese citizens (because if they were they wouldn't be
in China) have been pretty good about expressing their disapproval of
certain things in their delightfully quiet and polite Japanese way. Thus I
wanted to know whether any quiet, polite liberals had said anything about
it.
16. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Sunday, 6 November 2005 12:56 am
You don’t half ask a lot of questions dishuiguanyin-senpai
17. Laythstag left...
Sunday, 6 November 2005 12:11 pm
This is a shinto shrine in Washington, USA.
18. sun bin left...
Monday, 7 November 2005 3:29 am :: http://sun-bin.blogspot.com
1. Not only CCTV English Channel, many chinese media also made a lot of
effort to show the 'good' japanese, eg, the writer who wrote about 731
(bio-weapon in Manchuria) is well known in China.
The reason is very simple: to demonstrate support and show that many
Japanese are "on our side".
19. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Monday, 7 November 2005 4:46 pm
Laythstag
20. The Angry Chinese Blogger left...
Monday, 7 November 2005 4:55 pm
sun bin